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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- l 03(2)(h) &

G) (Lexis Nexus Vol. 9 2012).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the District Court eIT granting jurisdiction by finding Appellants were

properly served the Summons and Complaint? Rulings regarding the refusal to set aside a
default judgment for lack of jurisdiction or whether a person has been properly served are
reviewed as a question of law. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, il 8, I 00 P.3d
1211; see also Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n. 3 (Utah 1991 ).
2.

Did the District Court etT by denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the

Default Judgment based upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l)? Rulings pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(l) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Helgesen v. Jnyangumia, 636 P.2d
1079, 1081 (Utah 1981); see also Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1984); and
~

Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984).
Each of these issues were preserved in the District Court by motions, briefs and by
oral arguments before the District Court.

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING STATUTE OR RULE
Rules

Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A), Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l), and Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case

The Court is being asked to reverse the District Court's Order denying the Motion
to Set Aside the Default Judgment. The basis for Appellant's request is predicated upon
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A), 60(b)(l), and 60(b)(4).
Appellants entered into a lease agreement with Appellees to lease a residence. R.
at 9. During the course of the lease agreement, Appellants sold the property, which was
being leased, to a third party. R. at 85. Appellants entered into an agreement with the
third party that purchased the property and moved from the residence prior to the
expiration of the lease agreement. R. at 3,

iJ

13; 89-90. Despite the sale of the property to

a third party, Appellees filed a Complaint in District Court seeking to recover for unpaid
rents for the remaining duration of the lease and for damages to the residence, including
personal property. R. at I. Appellees served the Summons and Complaint upon Appellant
Jen Dressel' s mother, Peggy McKenzie, at the residence of Peggy McKenzie. R. at 21,
24. Appellants did not live at Peggy McKenzie's residence at the time of service, nor had
they lived at such residence as a married couple, and were living in their motorhome in
California. R. 91-92,

ifil

2-5; 94-95,

iJil

2-5; 97-98,

ilil 3-5; 136, ,I 2. Appellants did not

know of the Complaint prior the entering of the Default Judgment and did not file an
answer to the Complaint. Ibid. The District Court granted a Default Judgment, which
included an amount for damages to real and personal property, although the District
Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the amounts for the

/"\

Vi!J

uniiquidated damages, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). R. at 47-48.
2

Appellants received notice, through the mail, of the Default Judgment and timely
caused to be filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b). R. 91-92,

ilil 2- 5; 94-95, ilil 2- 5; 97-98, ilil 3- 5; 70-71. After review of the

briefs and conducting oral arguments on the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment,
the District Court denied vacating the Default Judgment. R. at 170-172.
Appellants' appeal seeks to reverse the District Court's decision denying the
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.

Course Proceedings and Disposition of the District Court
On November 13, 2014, the District Court granted a Default Judgment in favor of
Appellees. R. at 4 7-48. On December 23, 2014, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment. R. at 70-71. On March 24, 2015, the District Court ruled to deny
the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment at the hearing on the Motion. R. at 143. On
April 15, 2015, an Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was
entered by the District Court. R. at 170-72.

Statement of Facts
On November 10, 2013, Appellant Nate Dressel and Appellees entered in a "Utah
Residential Lease Agreement" (the "Agreement") concerning 672 Meadow Crest Way,
Saratoga Springs, Utah 84045 (the "Property"). R. at 9. Although the Agreement refers to
Tenant(s) as "Nate Dressel/Jen McKellar," only Appellant Nate Dressel signed the
Agreement. R. at 9, 18. On the same date, only Appellant Nate Dressel signed an
"Addendum No. 1 to Utah Residential Lease Agreement", which provided a move-in
date, utility contact information, information concerning furnished items, applicable laws,
3

repau

information,

landlord

contact

information,

yard

requirements,

parking

requirements, rent deposit information, and number of dogs allowed. R. at 18. The
Agreement provides that tenants are to pay a monthly rent amount of $1,350, beginning
on December 1, 2013. R. at 9,

ii

1. 1. The Agreement required a "security deposit" in the

amount of $1,650, to be paid no later than November 13, 2013. R. at 9,

ii

2.1. The

Agreement states that "[i]f Tenant breaches any obligation under this Agreement
Landlord has the right to retain the Security Deposit as liquidated damages." R. at 10, ,i
2.5 (bracket added). The term of the Agreement was from November 13, 2013 through
November 30, 2014, essentially a year. R. at 10, ,i 3. The Agreement states that if tenants
vacate the Property prior to completing the entire term of the Agreement, tenants must
pay "the greater of: (1) an early termination fee in the amount of three (3) months of rent;
or (2) the actual costs and damages incurred by Landlord[.]" R. at 10,

1 3.3

(bracket

added). Appellant Jen Dressel never signed the Agreement or Addendum and the parties
were not man-ied at the time Appellant Nate Dressel signed the Agreement. R. at 9-18;

137,13.
On August 1, 2014, Appellants notified Appellees that Appellants were vacating
the Property on the grounds of constructive eviction, effective August 1, 2014. R. at 119.
Appellants' August 1, 2014 letter also made a demand for the return of the security
deposit, minus $300 for pets, in the amount of $1,350, which was to be mailed by check
or money order to Nathan and Jennifer Dressel, 191 Moonlight Drive, Sequim,
Washington 98382. R. at 119. Appellants' August 1, 2014 letter never stated that

4

w

Appellants would be residing at the address given for the return of the security deposit,
only that funds could be sent to that address. R. at 119-20.
On August 7, 2014, counsel for Appellees sent Appellants a letter stating that
Appellants "breached the lease by unilaterally declaring the lease terminated and by
failing to pay rent when due." R. at 87. The letter also stated that, pursuant to 2.9 of the
Agreement, Appellees were evoking their right to claim the security deposit as liquidated
damages and that, pursuant to 3 .3 of the Agreement, Appellants are entitled to $4,050.00,
or three times the normal rent, as an early termination fee. R. at 87. Further, the letter also
stated that Appellees "will provide notice of any additional damages to the property for
which you may [sic] deemed responsible." R. at 87 (bracket added).
On August 8, 2014, Appellees signed a Warranty Deed on the Property, granting
the Property to Jason and Brandi Snyder, effectively concluding the sale of the Property.
R. at 85, 89. On August 12, 2014, 10:09 AM, the Warranty Deed conveying the Property
was recorded by the Utah County Recorder. R. at 85.
On August 12, 2014, Appellant Nate Dressel entered into a "Lease Tennination
Agreement" ("Termination") with the new owners of the Property, Jason and Brandi
Snyder. R. 89-90. The Termination states that "WHEREAS, the Premises will be sold
from Prior Landlord to CmTent Landlord, which includes the transfer of the Lease. The
Current Landlord will be the new owner of the Premises." R. at 89. The Termination
further sta_t_es that "[t]he Parties agree that in lieu of the original expiration date of the
November 30, 2014, the Lease shall terminate immediately upon the close of the sale

5

transaction between the Prior Landlord and Current Landlord." R. at 89,

iJ I (bracket

added).
On August 27, 2014, Appellees caused to be filed with the District Court a
Complaint seeking to recover $4,050 for an early termination fee, alleging that
Appellants "failed to pay rent for August" of 2014 and "have evidenced a clear intent to
refuse to pay rent for the months of September, October, and November" of 2014. R. at
1-3,

,r,r

('

I 2, 14. Appellees also alleged that Appellants caused damage to a dog kennel,

~

valued at $500, family heirlooms and art work removed from the walls, valued at $2,000,
bed coverings, sheets and other bedroom items, valued in excess of $500, damage to the
yard, grass and sprinkler system valued in excess of $1,000, and "other items as may be
discovered." R. at 3-4,

,r 16. Appellees allege Appellants owe at least $1,500 pursuant to

the Agreement for recovery of costs and attorney's fees. R. at 6,

,r

30. Appellees also

allege that they "have been injured as a result of [Appellants'] breach, and have elected to
retain [Appellants'] damage deposit as provided in the Lease Agreement." R. at 5,

,r 28

(bracket added). Appellees requested for an award from the District Court, to be proven
at trial, for at least $9,700, plus attorney's fees and costs of at least $1,500 but also to be
determined at trial. R. at 6-7,

,r A.

Appellees' Complaint states specifically the amounts

of $4,050 for unpaid rents, at least $4,000 for damage to the property, and at least $1,500
for attorney's fees, which is a total of $9,550, although Appellees requested for the Court
to award at least $9,700. R. 1-7.
On September 2, 2014, Appellees' counsel requested change of address
information concerning Appeliants from the U.S. Postmaster in Saratoga Springs, Utah,
6
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~

which the U.S. Postmaster replied on September 19, 2014 that Appellants forwarded their
mailing address to 191 Moonlight Dr., Sequim, Washington 98382. R. at 123. Appellees'
counsel obtained a "Comprehensive Report from Lexis-Nexis which also listed 191
Moonlight Drive as a possible current or prior address for one or both [Appellant]." R. at
100, ,I 4 (bracket added). Further, Appellees' counsel, although unsupported by any
documentation or a specific address, states that the National Guard indicated that
Appellant Nate Dressel "was residing in Washington." R. at 100, ,I 5.
On September 26, 2014, 12:08 PM, attempted service of the Summons and
Complaint was made upon Peggy McKellar, mother of Appellant Jen Dressel, at Peggy
McKellar's place of residence, 191 Moonlight Drive, Sequim Washington 98382, on
behalf of both Appellants, by Mari Fahey, a process server in the State of Washington
hired by Appellees. R. at 124, 127. The affidavit of Service for Appellant Nate Dressel
states:
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: That
s/he is now and at all times herein mentioned was a citizen of the United
States, over the age of eighteen, not an office of a plaintiff corporation, not
a party to nor interested in the above entitled action, and is competent to be
a witness therein.
On SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 at 12:08 pm, at the address of 191
MOONLIGHT DRIVE, SEQUIM 98382, within Clallam County,
Washington, this affiant served the above described documents upon NATE
DRESSEL by then and there personally delivering ONE true and correct
copy thereof, by then presenting to and leaving the same with MRS.
McKELLAR, MOTHER OF JEN DRESSEL aka JEN McKELLAR, a
white female, age approximately 55-60 yrs, height approximately 5 '4",
weight approximately 120 lbs, with black hear, a person of suitable age and
discretion then a resident therein.

7

R. at 127. The affidavit of Service of Summons and Complaint for Appellant Jen Dressel
states the exact same wording as for Appellant Nate Dressel, except "NATE DRESSEL"
is replaced with "JEN DRESSEL: aka JEN McKELLAR." R. at 124.
Peggy McKellar "told the process server that neither Nate Dressel nor Jen Dressel
resided at the address" and "refused to accept any papers from the process server." R. at
98,

,r,r 6-7. Peggy McKellar testified, through a declaration under penalty of perjury, that

Appellant Jen Dressel is her daughter, Appellant Jen Dressel has not resided at Peggy
McKellar's residence since 2012, where the attempted service of the Complaint was
made, and Appellant Nate Dressel as never resided at her address. R. 97-98,

,r,r

2-5.

Appellant Jen Dressel testified, through a declaration under penalty of perjury, that she
had not lived at her mother's address, Peggy McKellar, since 2012, her husband Nate
Dressel has never lived at Peggy McKellar's residence, and Appellants were living out of
their motorhome in California at the time Peggy McKellar received attempted service of
the Summons and Complaint. R. at 94-95,

,r,r

3-5; 136,

,r

2. Appellant Nate Dressel

testified, through a declaration under penalty of pe1jury, that he has never resided at
Peggy McKellar' s residence. R. at 91,

ii

3. Appellants testified that they did not receive

notice of the Complaint prior to the entering of the Default Judgment. R. at 91-92,

,r 4;

95, ,, 5.
On November 13, 2014, since no response or answer to the Complaint was filed
with the District Com1, the District Court entered a Default Judgment granting Appellees
a total of $13,005.70, which included a $9,700 principal amount, $485.20 for interest
from August 7, 2014 through November 14, 2014, $280 for Costs through November 4,
8
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2014, and $2,540.50 for attorney's fees through November 4, 2014. R. at 47-48. On
December 5, 2014, the Appellees caused to be filed with the District Court a Notice of
Entry of Judgment, which certified that the Notice of Entry of Judgment was mailed on
November 5, 2014, to Appellants at 191 Moonlight Drive, Sequim, Washington 98382.
R. at 59-60.

On or about December 16, 2014, Appellants received their first notice of
Appellees' Complaint when they received the Notice of Entry of Judgment, which was
certified by Appellees' counsel to have been sent on December 5, 2014 via U.S. Mail. R.
at 91-92, 14; 95, ii 5.
On December 23, 2014, Appellants caused to be filed with the District Court a
Motion and Memorandum in Support to Set Aside Default Judgment and Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6) ("Motion"), including Declarations from Appellants and Peggy
McKellar. R. at 70-98. In the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment and Dismiss Pursuant Rule l 2(b )( 6) ("Memorandum"), Appellants allege that
Appellant Jen Dressel had not lived at the address used for service of the complaint since
2012, Appellant Nate Dressel never lived at the address used for service, Peggy McKellar
told the process server that neither Appellant lived at her address, Peggy McKellar
"refused to accept any papers from the process server," and Appellants were not aware of
Appellees' Complaint until on or about December 16, 2014. R. at 73,

11

3-7. Also,

Appellants alleged that Appellees sold the Property on or about August 8, 2014, which
included all of Appellees' personal property. R. at 74, 11 9-10. Appellants alleged that
they "did not damage or take the dog kennel, family heirlooms, art work, bed, sheets,
9

other bedroom items or any other personal or real property belonging to [Appellees]," did
not damage the yard, grass, or sprinkler system of on the Property, Appellees' "bed

~

sheets were in a walk-in closet and never used", and Appellees' "heirlooms and art were
stored in the basement and were in the basement when [Appellants] vacated the
Q

property." R. at 74,

~~

11-14. The Appellants further alleged that since the Property and

personal property of Appellees were transferred to a third party upon the sale of the
Property, Appellees do not have standing to seek damages. R. 74-75,

~

15. Also,

Appellants alleged that due to the Termination Agreement, Appellants vacancy of the
Property was proper and not a breach of the Agreement. R. at 75,

~,r

19-21. Finally,

Appellants alleged that Appellees invoked their right to retain the security deposit as
liquidated damages, which prevented Appellees from recovering for any allegations
concerning a breach of the Agreement. R. at 75,

~1

16-18. A!l of Appellant's allegations

in the Memorandum were supported by declarations. R. at 91-98.
On January 7, 20 I 4, Appellees caused to be filed with the District Court a
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 12(6)(6) ("Opposition"), which provides states that "[Appellees] do not
dispute the timeliness of this motion," thus showing that the timeliness of Appellants'
Motion is undisputed. R. at I 03 (brackets added).
On January 15, 2015, Appellants caused to be filed with the District Court their
Reply to Appellees' Opposition by stating that Appellees' service of the Complaint was
not in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4. R. at 134. Further, Appellants reiterated their
allegations denying damage to property and that since the Property had been sold, unpaid
IO

Q

rents for August, September, October, and November would only be proper to the new
owners. R. at 134. Also, Appellants alleged that Appellant Jen Dressel did not sign the
lease and is not liable for any alleged breach of the Agreement. R. at 134
On March 24, 2015, the District Court heard oral arguments on the Motion. R. at
195-220. Appellants argued that after vacating the Property, they did not know where
they would be relocating, although they did not move to Sequim, Washington, and they
did forward their mail to Peggy McKellar's residence. R. at 198,

~~

1-9. Appellants also

contested that there was not proper service of the Summons and Complaint, pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 4. R. at 198,

~~

10-16. Further, Appellants argue that since Peggy

McKellar never accepted the Complaint from the process server, there was no documents
to forward onto Appellants. R. at 208,

ir~ 12-21. Appellants also argued that the first time

they received notice of the Complaint was when they received the Notice of Entry of
Judgment. R. at 198,

~~

17-21. Appellants then argued that under Utah R. Civ. P.

60(b )(I) "there was surprise, excusable neglect, inadvertence or mistake in not
responding in time" and that they have meritorious defenses. R. at 199, il~ 1-7. As for the
meritorious defenses, Appellants argued that Appellees invoked their right to the
liquidated damages by keeping the security deposit, which barred them from seeking to
further recover for breach of the Agreement. R. at 199,

~~

17-25. Another defense raised

by Appellants was the fact that Appellees sold the Property, including Appellees'
personal property, and lacked standing to seek recovery of rent for the months after the
Property was sold, particularly when there was a Termination agreement with the new
owners. R. at 200,

~~

9-24. Finally, Appellants raised the meritorious defense that any
ll

alleged damage to personal property is in dispute since Appel Iants provided declarations
contesting the alleged damage. R. at 200, 1il 4-8.
The District Court held that since Appellants provided an address where they
expected to have their security deposit sent, which was the same forwarding address
provided by the U.S. Postal Service, "[a]ll roads point to the fact that this 191 Moonlight
Drive in Washington is their usual place of abode and that was where they expected to
receive notifications regarding any mail that was received" and "[ s]o I'm finding that
there was effective service of process in this matter and it's more likely that the
[Appellants] were avoiding service in this matter. R. at 212, ,I~ 7-24 (brackets added). As
for Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l), the District Court stated:
With regard to the motion to set aside using mistake, surprise, excusable
neglect, I don't find that because normally those circumstances come up
when a party obtains service and respondents then don't respond for one
reason or another. Usually some emergency. Maybe out of the country.
Those kinds of things wherein that rule comes into play. Here, I don't see
how if you don't respond you can get excusable neglect or mistake or
anything like that, claiming you weren't served. So I don't think under
those circumstances the motion to set aside is well taken. Based upon that
then, I'm going to deny the motion to set aside default judgment. Therefore,
we don't get to the motion to dismiss because of that.

I recognize as well that default judgments are not really well liked by the
courts. We want to hear issues. But in this case it's clear to me that that was
the address where they said they could be served. I don't see anything that
really refutes that at all. So that's the ruling.
R. 213-14,

11

25, 1-16. The District Court never ruled on Appellants' meritorious

defenses or the need for an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. R. 95-220. Further,
the District Court did not rule on Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Utah R. Civ.

12

P. 12(b ). R. 95-220. On April 15, 2015, an Order denying the Motion was entered by the
District Court. R. at 170-72.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellants request for the Court to reverse the District Court's ruling denying the
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment based on the following: ( 1) Appellants were not
served the Complaint at their dwelling house or usual place of abode, pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A); (2) Appellants timely moved the District Court to set aside the Default
Judgment, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b )~ (3) Appellants, due to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, failed to file an answer to the Complaint
with the District Court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b )(1 ); and (4) Appellants have
meritorious defenses to Appellees' claims in the Complaint.
Appellants contend that the service of the Summons and Complaint was not proper
smce it was served upon Peggy McKellar, Appellant Jen Dressel's mother, at her
residence. Despite using Peggy McKellar's address as a forwarding address for mail,
Appellants had never resided at that address as a married couple, and Appellant Nate
Dressel never resided at that address ever. As such, Peggy McKellar's address was not
Appellants' personal dwelling house or usual place of abode and service of the Complaint
upon Peggy McKellar on behalf of Appellants was improper without the District Court
first granting Appellees an Order to serve Appellants by alternative methods. Further, the
affidavits of the Summons and Complaint are defective since it does not state that
Appellants either were present or resided at the address for which the Summons and
Complaint were allegedly served. Therefore, since process service of the Summons and
13
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Complaint was improper and the affidavit of service was defective, the Court should
reverse the District Court's Ruling and Order denying the setting aside of the Default
Judgment.
It is undisputed that Appellants moved the District Court to vacate the Default
Judgment timely. Nevertheless, since the Default Judgment was entered by the District
Court on November 13, 2014 and Appellants caused to be filed with the District Court a
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on December 23, 2014, Appellants were well
within the 90-day period provided by Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Appellants contend that they never received notice of Appellees' Complaint up
and until receiving the Notice of Entry of Judgment, despite Peggy McKellar allegedly
being served with the Complaint. Appellants failure to answer or respond to the
Complaint was either a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect since they
were not aware of the legal action until after the Default Judgment had been entered and
there was a mistake as to the validity of the process of service.
Further, Appellants alleged meritorious defenses, including Appellees selling the
Property, alleging that no damage was done to real or personal property, Appellees
invoking the right to recover liquidated damages, constructive eviction, and lack of
standing against Appellant Jen Dressel, who did not sign the Agreement. As such, since
the District Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment, the Court should reverse the District Court's Ruling and Order denying the
setting aside of the Default Judgment.
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ARGUMENT

,.;;

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PROCESS
SERVICE OF APPELLEES'
SUMMMONS AND
COMPLAINT ON
APPELLANTS' DWELLING HOUSE OR USUAL PLACE OF ABODE WAS
PROPER AND THAT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID AND
SHOULD NOT BE VACA TED.
Utah R. Civ. P. 4( d)(l) states that "unless waived in writing, service of the
summons and complaint shall be done by one of the following methods:" personal
service, service by mail or commercial courier service, service in a foreign country, and
other service. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A), which goes into detail concerning the method
of personal service, states:
Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or
(D) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process[.]

(Emphasis and bracket added).
An individual's usual place of abode has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court
when it stated:
Usual place of abode is sometimes referred to as being synonymous with
domicile or permanent residence. In our judgment there is a broad
distinction between domicile and usual place of abode as the latter term is
used in our statute. That is, where a person -lives - at the particular time
when the summons is served, constitutes his usual place of abode.

Reed v. Reed, 806 P .2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1991 ); quoting Grant v. Lawrence, I 08 P. 931
(Utah 1910). The Court further stated that "[ n Jo hard and fast rule can be fashioned to
determine what is or is not a party's 'dwelling house or usual place of abode' within the
15
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rule's meaning; rather the practicalities of the particular fact situation determine whether
service meets the requirements of 4( d)(l) (bracket added)." Id. The Court continued:
The provision concerning usual place of abode should be construed
liberally to effectuate service if actual notice has been received by the
defendant and that in the last analysis the question of service must be
resolved by 'what best serves to give notice to a defendant the he is being
served with process, considering the situation from a practical standpoint.'

Id.; quoting I BaITon & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 177, at 299 (Wright
ed. 1960).
It is well established that it is the burden of the Appellants to show that Appellees'

service of the Summons and Complaint was improper, which prevents the District
Court's jurisdiction. Zions First Nat 'I Bank v. Christensen, 2000 Utah App. 76,

,r 2; see

also Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1998) ([Defendant] had
the burden of showing that the service was invalid") (bracket added); Reed, 806 P .2 at
1185 ("The burden was upon defendant to prove that service was improper."). The Court
has stated that "'(w]hen a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a
court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exits, and the burden is on
the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence."' Zions First Nat 'I Bank, at

,r

2,

quoting Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 775 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
The Court has also stated that "the invalidity or absence of service can be shown
by clear and convincing evidence." Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983).
"To overcome his burden, defendant was required to provide competent evidence
showing that service of process was not completed or improper" and that only arguments
through counsei without sworn statements from the party does not meet the burden of
16
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proof that the District Court was without personal jurisdiction. Zions First Nat 'I Bank,

iril

4-5.
However, when there is a dispute as to the facts to determine usual place of abode,
the District Court must resolve such dispute "by depositions or an evidentiary hearing."

Stan Katz Real Estate v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 1977). In Stan Katz Real
Estate, a default judgment was entered and the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment, which included an affidavit stating "That he was not living or residing
at the home of his parents at the time plaintiff alleges that service was made upon his
mother." Id. at 1142. Despite the fact that the notation on the return of service stated
"Mother stated he [the defendant] had just gone to the store and he did live there and
would be right back," the Court held that both statements supported a "dispute on the fact
of the usual place of abode of the defendant." Id. at 1143-44. The Court further stated that
an evidentiary hearing was needed to test representations of the witness, based upon the
following:
Had no factual dispute arisen to plague the parties' substantive
rights, we would perceive no difficulty in the judge's acceptance as a
predicate for his action, of the facts represented through statements by
members of the bar and affidavits of the patties or others. In this case,
however, despite the factual questions developing as the hearing moved
along, no opportunity was afforded anyone to test any representation by the
chastening process of cross-examination .... The opportunity to judge
credibility was non-existent as to the absent affiants; the opportunity to
probe by cross-examination was completely lacking. Without these twin
tools, normal in the trial of factual issues, the factual conclusion was certain
to take on an unaccustomed quality of artificiality ... We recognize, of
course, that trial judges have a discretion to hear and determine ordinary
motions either on affidavits or oral testimony portraying facts not appearing
of record. We not, however, that an attempted resolution of factual disputes
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on conflicting affidavits alone may pose the question whether the discretion
was properly exercised.

Id. at 1143; quoting A utera v. Robinson, 419 F .2d 1197, 1202 (D. C. Cir. 1969).
Therefore, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1144.
It has also been established that an affidavit of service is defective when "[t]here is

G

no assertion that the defendants so resided or were served," which provides that "the
affidavit is wholly inadequate to establish proper service pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure." Southland Cons fl•. v. Semnani, 2001 UT 6,

i

3 (bracket

added). The Court continued by stating that an affidavit of service is defective if it fails
"to allege that defendants were either residing or present at the prope1ty where service
was made." Id at ,r 5. Further, if such affidavit of service is defective and it is combined
with "defendants' affidavit testifying that they resided elsewhere," it is an abuse of
discretion for the District Court to fail to set aside a default judgment. Id. at ,r 5.

A.
Appellants Were Not Served The Summons and Complaint at Their Personal
Dwelling or Usual Place of Abode And The Default Judgment is Void Pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4}.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) states that "the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding ... [when] the judgment is void. (Bracket added).
The Court held that "[a] judgment is void under rule 60(6)(4) if the court that
rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or parties or the judgment was
entered without the notice required by due process," which is "true even absent a separate
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meritorious defense" since "[t]he court's lack of jurisdiction is alone sufficient to void its
judgment." Sewell v. Xpress Lube, 20 I 3 UT 61, ii 18 (brackets added).
In Reed, after the entering of a decree of divorce by the district court, the
defendant was served a summons by a sheriff at his parents' home to recover a truck
awarded in the divorce proceeding, and the defendant challenged this his parents' home
was not his usual place of abode. 806 P.2d at 1182. The Court held that, despite
defendant's parents' claim to the process server that defendant was out of state at the time
of the service, that the totality of the circumstances of defendant residing with his parents
during the divorce, plaintiff witnessing defendant's presence in town around the time of
service, defendant using his parents' address as his address for his tax returns the
previous year, defendant's actual knowledge of the summons less than two weeks after it
had been served, and since defendant "failed to show he lived elsewhere," the parents'
home was defendant's place of abode and service was proper. Id at 1184-85.
In the present case, Appellants submitted to the District Court testimony, via
declarations, from themselves and Appellant Jen Dressel's mother, Peggy McKellar. R. at
91-98. The declarations stated that neither Appellant lived at the address at the time the
Summons and Complaint was attempted to be served, Appellants had never resided at the
address during their marriage, Appellant Jen Dressel had not lived at the address for over
two years, and Appellant Nate Dressel had never lived at the address. R. at 91, ilil 2-3; 9495,

ilil 2-4; 97-98, ilil 3-6. Conversely, Appellant Jen Dressel submitted a declaration

stating that the Appellants resided in their motorhome and were in California at the time
of the alleged service of the Summons and Complaint. R. at 136,
19

il 2. Also, Peggy

McKellar submitted a declaration stating that she told the process server that Appellants
did not live at the address and "refused to accept any papers from the process server." R.
at 9 8, iiiI 6-7.
Appellees stated thf.tt they used Peggy McKellar's address to serve the Summons
and Complaint because Appellants left that address with Appellees as a place to be
contacted in the future, the U.S. Post Office had the same address as a forwarding address
for Appellants, a Lexus search showed that either one or both of the Appellants either
currently or used to reside at the same address, and that Appellant Nate Dressel's known
employer, the National Guard, informed Appellees' counsel that Appellant Nate Dressel
resided in Washington, although an actual address was not provided by the Appellant
Nate Dressel's known employer. R. at I 00, ilil 2-5.
Appellants met the burden for showing that Appellees' service of the Summons
and Complaint was improper and the District Court did not have jurisdiction. Appellants
submitted declarations that they were not physically at Peggy McKellar's residence nor
had they resided at such address. Further, Peggy McKellar testified through her
declaration that Appellants did not reside at her address. Likewise, Appellants testified
that they were living out of their motor home in California at the time of the alleged

.

service. Nonetheless, Appellants do not dispute that that they used Peggy McKellar's
address to give to other parties for the forwarding of their mail and for future contact.
However, Appellants dispute that they ever claimed that their personal dwelling or usual
place of abode would be or was at Peggy McKellar's residence. The fact is that
Appellants have never iived together at Peggy IvicKeiiar' s residence, they only used the
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address of such residence for contact purposes until they could determine an actual place
of residence, beside their motor home. As such, Peggy McKellar's residence is not
Appellants' personal dwelling or usual place of abode.
Appellees' claim that a forwarding address is substantial evidence of a usual place
of abode is inconsistent with the fact that Appellant Nate Dressel never resided at Peggy
McKellar's residence. Further, unlike in Reed, no evidence was shown that Appellants
were physically seen at the residence around the time of service, resided at the residence
for any specific amount of time, -or that Appellants used the address for any identifying
purposes, such as tax returns, licenses, loans, etc. Appellees only provided forwarding
contact information as evidence, which they claim is a showing of a usual place of abode.
Also, Appellants submitted testimony that controverted testimony or evidence by
Appellees concerning Appellants' usual place of abode and the District Court should've
held an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of that evidence. See Stan Katz Real

Estate, 565 P .2d at 1144. However, the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing,
despite a crucial conflict that requires the matter to be resolved, to test representations of
the witnesses. Id. As such, and at the very least, the Court should remand the issue to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing concerning the evidence to determine
Appellants' usual place of abode.
Notwithstanding conflicting evidence, the District Court construed too liberally
that Peggy McKellar's residence is Appellants' usual place of abode since Appellants did
not receive actual notice prior to the entering of the Default Judgment. See Reed, 806
P .2d at I 185. In fact, Appellants did not receive actual notice until receiving the Notice of
21

Entry of Judgment. Appellants have met the burden to show that the improper service of
the Summons and Complaint was not notice required for due process.

Since the

Q

Appellants did not have due process, the District Court lacked jurisdiction, which "alone
is sufficient to void its [Default] judgment". Sewell, 2013 UT 61 at ,r 18 (bracket added).
As such, the Court should reverse the District Court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment.

B.

Appellees' Affidavits of Service Are Defective.
The affidavits of service for the Summons and Complaint by the process server

only states that Peggy McKe!1ar resided or was present at the time of the service. R. at
124, 127. The affidavits of service fail "to allege that [Appellants] were either residing or
present at the property where service was made." R. at 124, 127; Southland Constr., 2006
UT at ,r 5 (bracket added).
The affidavits of service are defective since they fail to allege that Appellants
either resided or were present at the property where service was made. Id. Appellants
submitted testimony that they did not live at the address where service was allegedly
made, although there was testimony that they lived in their motorhome in California.
r_'·:

\@I

Like in Southland Constr., since the affidavits of service are defective and Appellants
submitted testimony that they resided elsewhere, the District Court abused its discretion
by not setting aside the Default Judgment, if not dismissing the case entirely. Id. at

iii! 5-

6. Therefore, the Court should reverse the District Court's denial of the Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment.
~'
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C.

The District Court's Ruling Provides for Impractical Usual Places of Abode.

The District Court stated that Appellants "provided an address in which they
expected to have their deposit sent," "the same address provided by the U.S. Postal
Services as the [Appellants'] forwarding address," and "the notice of judgment was sent
to that address as well," which establishes that "[ a ]11 roads point to the fact that this 19 I
Moonlight Drive in Washington is their usual place of abode and that was where they
expected to receive notifications regarding any mail that was received." R. at 212,

11 9-

20 (brackets added). Essentially, the District court ruled that since Appellants arranged
for their mail to be sent to a particular address, that address was their residence, dwelling,
or usual place of abode.
The flaw with the District Court's reasoning is that its ruling invites impractical
usual places of abode. Based upon the very same reasoning as used by the District Court,
a post office box could be held to be a usual place of abode. Obviously it is impossible
for a post office box to be a usual place of abode. Surely no one's dwelling is in a post
office box. However, the District Court relied upon the fact that Appellants provided a
forwarding address to Appellees, which was the same address they provided to the U.S.
Post Office to have their mail forwarded, and the Notice of Entry of Judgment, which
was sent by mail, was received at the same forwarded address. So, if Appellants had used
a post office box as their address, the District Court's rational would have established that
Appellants' usual place of abode was a post office box, which is impractical.
Since the District Court's reasoning can establish that a usual place of abode can
be a post office box, it is likely not proper to use that same reasoning to establish that
23

Peggy McKellar's residence is Appellants' usual place of abode. The District Court
should rely upon more concrete and determinative evidence to establish whether
Appellants' usual place of abode was where service was alleged to have been made. The
District Court should have more evidence, like in Reed, where the Court relied upon
testimony of witnesses, documents used for identifying purposes, and evidence of
specific periods that the party was physically at the dwelling. 806 P.2d at 1185. As such,
since the District Court did not rely on more concrete evidence, the Court should reverse
the District Court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
n

LI•

Granting Alternative Service After the Fact is Not Due Process.
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A) states:
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon
all of the individual pa1iies is impracticable under the circumstances, or
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is
avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by
publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth
the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual
parties.
The District Court stated at the -hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default

Judgment that "I'm finding that there was effective service of process in this matter and
it's more likely that the [Appellants] were avoiding service in this matter." R. at 212,

~1

21-24 (bracket added).
At the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, the District Court
ruled that one of the reasons it found effective service of process was because Appellants
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were avoiding service. However, Utah R. Civ. P. 4( d)( 4) provides that if a party is
avoiding service, a motion seeking alterative service may be filed allowing for service of
process to be carried out in a different way other than by the personal method. It seems
that the District Court granted alternative service after the fact without Appellees first
moving the District Court for permission to seek service alternatively. The District
Court's granting of alternative service after the fact is a bypass of due process.
The circumstance of Appellants living out of a motor home at the time of the
alleged process of service likely supports that Appellees could have sought alternative
service. However, asking for forgiveness rather than permission, which is what Appellees
did regarding proper process service, is not proper procedure to ensure due process. The
standard is not what is best for the Appellees in conducting service, rather "the question
of service must be resolved by what best serves to give notice to [Appellants] that [they]
being served with process, considering the situation from a practical standpoint." Reed,
806 P.2d at 1185 (bracket added). The importance of due process is a fundamental
constitutional right of Appellants that must not be taken lightly. Appellees were required
to seek the most proper way possible for process service upon Appellants, including
moving the District Court for alternative service. Nevertheless, it was improper for the
District Court to grant alternative service after the fact. As such, the Court should reverse
the District Court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l).
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) states:
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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, smprise, or
excusable neglect ... (4) the judgment is void ... or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons ( 1), (2), or (3 ), not more than 90 days after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken[.]

(Emphasis added).
The Court had held in Menzies v. Galetka that "[i]n general, a movant is entitled to
have a default judgment set aside under 60(b) if (I) the motion is timely; (2) there is a
basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has
alleged a meritorious defense." 2006 UT 81, il 64.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment was timely since the Default Judgment was entered on November 13, 2014 and
the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was filed on December 23, 2014, well
within the 90 days required, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Appellees conceded in
their Opposition brief that there is no timeliness issue. R. at 103. Therefore, Appellants
will only provide argument as to the basis for granting relief under 60(b )( 1) and
Appellants' alleged meritorious defenses.

A.

Appellants Have a Basis For Relief Under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l).
Concerning a decision to relieve a party from a final judgment pursuant to Utah R.

Civ. P. 60(b )(1 ), the Court held in Helgesen v. Jnyangumia that "discretion should be
exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful
case to the end that the party may have a hearing." 636 P.2d 1079, I 08 I. The Court
further stated that "'it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to
26

vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to set it aside."' Id., quoting

Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 1962).
In Lund v. Brown, the Court stated that "a trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to set aside a default," but that "discretion is not unlimited." 2000 UT
75, if 9.
In Sewell, the Court stated:
Rule 60(6 )( 1) provides relief from a default judgment entered as a result of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. To qualify for relief
under rule 60(b )( 1), a party must show he has used due diligence. Due
diligence is established where the 'the failure to act was the result of... the
neglect one would expect from a reasonably prudent person under similar
circumstances.'
2013 UT 61, if 29; quoting Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ,I 27; see

also Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep 't, 1999 UT App 330,

~if

5, 10 ("The law

disfavors default judgments" and "To demonstrate that the default was due to excusable
neglect, 'the movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control"', quoting Airkem

lntermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429,431 (Utah 1973)).
In Metro. Water Dist. Of Salt Lake v. Sorf, the District Court stated that "what's
been offered here as excusable neglect ... is fairly characterized as Mr. Sorf was not aware
of the complaint" and that "the law is fairly clear that [when the rule for perfecting
service is complied with, that] is not excusable neglect." 2013 UT 27,

~

16. However, the

Court disagreed by stating that "the district court conflated the provisions of rule
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60(b )(1 ), which refers to instances of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect" with the provisions of rule 60(b )( 4 ), which refers to instances where a judgment
is void for a failure of service of process." Id. The Court further stated that "'if the default
is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake,
default would not have occmTed, the equity side of the court would grant relief. Id.,

quoting May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984). Also, the Court stated that
"in accordance with the intent of rule 60(b) to ensure that paiiies are afforded 'a full
opporiunity to present their evidence and contentions as to disputed issues so [that cases]
may be disposed of on substantial rather than upon technical grounds." Id., quoting

McKean v. Mountain View Mem 'I Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1966). The
Court then held that one of the factors included the individual's wife refusing service by
throwing the papers, Summons and Complaint, at the process server, where the pap_ers
were left on the ground and the complaint was no longer on the ground when the
individual returned home from work, thus the individual mistakenly believed he had not
been served and vacated the district court's denial fo the motion to set aside the default
judgment. Id. at~ 20, 26.
In the present case, at the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment, the District Court stated:
With regard to the motion to set aside using mistake, surprise, excusable
neglect, I don't find that because normally those circumstances come up
when a party obtains service and respondents then don't respond for one
reason or another. Usually some emergency. Maybe out of the country.
Those kinds of things wherein that rule comes into play. Here, I don't see
how if you don't respond you can get excusable neglect or mistake or
anything like that, claiming you weren't served. So I don't think under
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those circumstances the motion to set aside is well taken. Based upon that
then, I'm going to deny the motion to set aside default judgment.
R. at 213-214,

iJil

25, 1-10. The District Court's reasoning was almost the very same

reasoning used by district court in Metro Water Dist., which was reversed. Id. at 16, 26.
Appellants testified that they never received actual notice of the Summons and
Complaint. R. at 91, 14; 95, 15. Peggy McKellar, who was served by Appellees' process
server, "refused to accept any papers from the process server." R. at 98,

ii

7. Further,

Appellants testified that the only notice they received was when they received the Notice
of Entry of Judgment in the mail. R. at R. at 91,

if 4;

95, iJ 5.

It is reasonable that Peggy McKellar was mistaken or had excusable neglect for
not taking the Summons and Complaint and forwarding it on to Appellants. Likewise, it
is reasonable that Peggy McKellar did not notify Appellants of the alleged service. As a
result of such mistake or excusable neglect by Peggy McKellar, Appellants did not have
actual notice of the Summons and Complaint. Like in Sewell, Appellants demonstrated
due diligence since Appellants' failure to act, or answer the Complaint, was "neglect one
would expect from a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." 2013 UT
61, 1 29. Further, like in Black's Title, Inc., Appellants showed that they were "prevented
from appearing by circumstances over which [they] had no control." 1999 UT App 330,

~

IO (bracket added).
The District Court ended its inquiry at the fact it found that service of process was
proper and disregarded whether Appellants "could have still been mistaken about
whether [they] had been served or was obligated to file an answer." Nletro. Water Dist.,
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2013 UT 27 at il 17 (bracket added). Instead the District Court held that Appellants' claim
of improper service did not proyide a basis for mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.

W

Like in Metro. Water Dist., the District Court "conflated the provisions of rule 60(b )(I)
... with the provisions of rule 60(b)(4)." Id. at

,r

16. This is supported by the District
Q

Court's statement:

I recognize as well that default judgments are not really well liked by the
courts. We want to hear the issues. But in this case it's clear to me that that
was the address where they said they could be served. I don't see anything
that really refutes that at all.
R. at 214,

ir,r

12-16. The District Court disregard the distinct separation between the

Appellants having a valid claim of mistake and/or excusable neglect, and the Default
Judgment being void for lack of proper service, which would deny the District Court
jurisdiction. As such, the District Court failed to diligently consider mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect beyond the provisions of Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b )(4).
Even if Appellants themselves had mistakenly thought that the process service was
not proper, they would be "mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would
not have occurred," and the equity side of the District Court should have granted relief.
Id. However, Appellants did not know of the process service and never knew of the case

prior to the entering of the Default Judgment. If not for the mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect by either Peggy McKellar or Appellants, an answer would
have been filed in response to the Complaint and the Default Judgment would not have
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occurred. Therefore, the Court should reverse the District Court's denial of the Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment.
B.

•

Appellants Alleged Meritorious Defenses.

In Lund, the Court stated that "[ w ]e have held that relief from judgment requires a
showing of a meritorious defense to a claim." 2000 UT 75,

1 28.

In Metro. Water Dist.,

the Court stated that the requirement for showing meritorious defenses "is a low bar, and
'a party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard."' 2013 UT
27, 124, quoting Lund, 2000 UT 75 at il 29. Further, in Judson, the Court also stated that
"[ t]he proffer of a meritorious defense under rule 60(b) is subject to a liberal pleading
standard analogous to that prescribed under rule 8, which requires only that a party state
the basis for its claims or defenses in short and plain terms" and that the defenses, "if
proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant."
2012 UT 6,

1 23. "Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense,

if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant or counterclaimant, it
has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purpose of its
motion to set aside a default judgment." Lund, 2000 UT 75 at 129.
In the present case, the District Court never made a ruling concerning whether
Appellants' defenses were meritorious. However, Appellants did allege defenses to
Appellees' Complaint, which include Appellees' sale of the Property, allegations that no
damage was done to real or personal property, Appellees invoking their right to
liquidated damages, constructive eviction, and failure to show standing against Appellee
Jen Dressel, who did not sign the Agreement. Based upon these alleged meritorious
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defenses, which, if proven, preclude a total or partial recovery of Appellees' claims, the
District Court's ruling should be reversed and the Default Judgment should be vacated.
1.

Appellees sold the Property to a third party.

On or before August 8, 2014, Appellees entered into an agreement with a third
party to sell the Property, where a Warranty Deed, signed by Appellees on August 8,
2014, was recorded with the Utah County Recorder on August 12, 2014, conveying the
Property from Appellees to the third party. R. at 84. Appellees' Complaint is seeking
unpaid rent amounts for the months of August, September, October, and November of
2014. R. at 3,

ir 14. Further, Appellants entered into a Lease Tennination Agreement with

the third party that bought the Property from Appellees. R. at 89, 90.
Appellants alleged that since Appellees no longer owned the Property for most of
August and all of September, October, and November of 2014, they are not damaged by
the non-payment of rent, except for possibly a week or so in August, depending on when
the Property was actually sold. Further, since Appellants entered into the Lease
Termination Agreement with the buyers of the Property, no rent is due from August
through November by Appellants. Therefore, since Appellees did not sustain damages for
unpaid rent from August through November and Appellants entered into a Lease
Termination Agreement with the buyers of the Property, Appellants have alleged a
meritorious defense, which, if proven, precludes a total or partial recovery of Appellees'
claims.
2.

Appellants alleged they did not damage real or personal property.
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Appellees alleged that damage was done by Appellants to a dog kennel, family
heirlooms and art work, bed coverings, sheets, other bedroom items, the yard, grass, and
sprinkler system, totaling an amount of $4,000. R. at 4,

ii

16.

Appellants have testified, through declarations, that all the personal and real
property alleged to be damaged was· transferred to the third party who bought the
property, which establishes that Appellees did not sustain the alleged damages. R. 92,
7, 12; 95,

ilil 8,

il1

13. Appellants testified that they did not damage any family heirlooms or

art work, where both were stored in the basement and remained in the basement at the
time Appellants vacated the Property. R. at 92,

if

11; 95,

if

12. Appellants testified that

they did not damage bed coverings, sheets, or other bedroom items, where the bed sheets
were kept in a walk-in closet and never used. R. at 92,

if,J 8,

10; 95,

ifil 9,

11. Appellants

also testified that they did not damage the yard, grass, or sprinkler system. R. at 92,
95,

ii

ii 9;

10. As such, there is a genuine dispute concerning the allegations of damage to

Appellees' real and personal property.
The District Court never held an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
55(b )(2) to determine the validity of the alleged unliquidated damages concerning real
and personal property. Due to no evidentiary hearing, it has not been established the true
value or extent of the alleged damage to Appellees' real and personal property. Further,
Appellees' calculation and request for damages in their Complaint fails to include the
amount of the security deposit withheld from Appellants. As a result, the Default
Judgment amount awarded does not show any adjustment to Appellees' claims for the
$1,350 retained by Appellees. Therefore, since Appellants show a genuine dispute
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regarding Appellees' allegations to real and personal property, which the value of such
alleged unliquidated damages have not been verified or adjusted by the District Court in
an evidentiary hearing, Appellants have alleged a meritorious defense, which, if proven,
precludes a total or partial recovery of Appellees' claims.
3.

Liquidated damages.

On August 7, 2014, Appellants received a letter from Appellees' counsel invoking
the right to withhold Appellants security deposit, in the amount of $1,650, as liquidated
damages. R. at 126. The Agreement states that "[i]f Tenant breaches any obligation under
this Agreement Landlord has the right to retain the Security Deposit as liquidated
damages." R. at 10,

,r

2.5. Appellants allege that by invoking the liquidated damages,

Appellees are barred from seeking further recovery from Appellants concerning a breach
of the Agreement. R. at 78. However, Appellees allege that another section of the
Agreement,

,r

2.9, governs and requires Appellants to forfeit their security deposit as

liquidated damages and pay further fees upon a breach of the Agreement. R. at 126.
Appellants allege that, at the very least, the Agreement is ambiguous concerning
liquidated damages and any such ambiguity should go against the drafter of the
Agreement, which is Appellees. If it is found that the Appellees invoking of the
liquidated damages prevents recovery of further claims for damages, Appellees are
precluded from recovery of their claims. As such, Appellants have alleged a meritorious
defense, which, if proven, precludes a total or partial recovery of Appellees' claims.
4.

Constructive eviction.
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On August 1, 2014, Appellants sent Appellees written notice that Appellants
were vacating the Property due to constructive eviction, which was based upon the fact
that Appellees continuously entered the Property without notice. R. at 119-120. If
constructive eviction is proved, Appellees cannot be granted relief for breach of the
Agreement. As such, Appellants have alleged a meritorious defense, which if proven,
precludes a total or partial recovery of Appellees' claims.
5.

Appellant Jen Dressel did not sign the Agreement.
Appellant Jen Dressel testified that she did not sign the Agreement. R. at 137, 13.

Further, the Agreement, nor the Addendum to the Agreement, does not bear the signature
of Appellant Jen Dressel. R. at 17-18. Since Appellant Jen Dressel did not sign the
Agreement, or the Addendum to the Agreement, Appellant Jen Dressel is likely not liable
for any allegation concerning a breach of the Agreement and cannot be a party to the
Appellees' Complaint. Therefore, Appellant Jen Dressel has alleged a meritorious
defense, which, if proven, precludes a total or partial recovery of Appellees' claims as to
her.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing alleged meritorious defenses by Appellants,
the District Court's ruling should be reversed and the Default Judgment should be
vacated.

II

II
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request for the reversal of the
District Court's erroneous ruling to deny the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment,
based upon ineffective process service, which establishes lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(A) and 60(b)(4), and for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or
excusable neglect, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l).
DATED this 29th, day of December, 2015.

LAKEY HOGELIN, PLLC

. Hogelin
rney for Defendants/Appellants
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